


Failure to Downman Rig during Cyclone George









CYCLONE FEAR


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9 NATIONAL NEWS





2007/03/06 01:30:00
MTSAT-1R IR1



MTSAT-1R HRIT DATA 2 6 MAR 07065 0M30000

Incident Overview

1. **Tropical low moved very rapidly on Friday morning 02 Mar in between 12 hr weather forecasts**
2. **Down Manning was commenced On Fri 02 Mar 07:**
 - a. 4 flights completed on 02-03 Mar, organised last flight AM 04 Mar;
 - b. Security of rig completed (secured) at 0545h Sun 04 Mar; and
 - c. Final flight coordinated to depart Darwin at 0800 to collect final 17 crew
3. **08:30h Sun 04 Mar, Helicopter Company informed Client that it was now unsafe for helicopter evacuation of the remaining crew.**
4. **Helo company evacuates Truscott at 1300hrs and flies back to Darwin with helicopter**
5. **PM Tue 06 Mar, (54 hrs) Cyclone George was at nearest point (220 Km) south of Songa Venus.**
6. **Another operator 20km north of Venus decided not to down man completely and rode out the storm with a skeleton crew**

Key Factors

1. **Evening of Sat 03 Mar: Comment made by Helo Co to Drlg DSV that there was only a 50/50 chance of the Sunday flight being able to proceed anyway due to weather and**
2. **This was not communicated from Client DSV to Songa nor to Client operations management onshore.**
3. **Sun 0830h 04 Mar; flight cancelled due to low cloud base at Truscott and Troughton Island**
4. **Mercy flight criteria not able to be met, which requires:**
 - a. Helicopter crew and occupants not being subjected to undue risk; and
 - b. Must have an alternate landing site meeting criteria, which could not be met.
5. **Throughout event alternative fly points were discussed and assumed available**
6. **Initially weather forecasts were received on 12 hr frequency**

Songa was served with an ‘Improvement Notice’

under (a) clause 3(1)(e) of schedule 7 to the Act “the operator of a facility must implement and maintain appropriate procedures and equipment for the control of, and response to, emergencies at the facility”

NOPSA’s improvement notice stated Songa failed to completely down-man the SV in the face of the approaching TC George leaving seventeen personnel onboard the MODU until the cyclone had passed by.

Learnings

1. All stakeholders need to be involved in drill/review/acceptance of Site Specific ERP's.
 1. Upfront early consultation on the what if's wrt aviation plan
 2. Desk top must also involve all stake holders

2. The aviation resources are contracted to the Title Holder, Rig Operator has a lack of direct control/communication access
 1. There must be a direct interface between rig and Helo dispatcher
 2. To many interfaces leads quickly to confusion and dispatcher overload

3. General Lack of understanding between parties of operational limitations, particularly aviation:
 1. Limitations of flight due to low cloud base,
 2. Aircraft instrumentation configuration Vs flight conditions, and
 3. lack of access to alternative landing locations.


Learnings - Cont

4. All concerns (ie: 50/50 likelihood to fly) are to be immediately presented to all stakeholders.
5. Down manning for cyclone is not a routine operation it is part of emergency response and needs to be treated as such
6. Helo company needs to be more predictive in such events
 1. Maybe we can fly is no good
 2. Give a deadline whereby after such a time we cant fly
7. The development of a storm should warrant an increase in frequency of weather forecasts
8. Weather forecasts do not give a clear indication of acceptable landing alternates

Learnings – Cont

9. AUSAR does not have the equipment to render assistance they can facilitate rescue if resources are available in the area
10. Aircraft and alternate landing strips are not equipped with modern flight instrumentation to fly storm conditions
 1. IFR
 2. Directional GPS
 3. Approved landing strips
 4. Trained personnel
 5. Support facilities; Refuelling, Ammenities, Sun protection etc


Sphere of Influence



Songa
Offshore

Cloud Base

2007/03/03 05:30:00
MTSAT-1R IR1



MTSAT-1R THRIT DATA 3 MAR 07062 0820190


Learnings – Cont

11. Gale force wind is not the only criteria to consider in the plan for evacuation low cloud cover can restrict flights
12. The source of fixed wing aircraft can also be affected
 1. Darwin aircraft were made inactive by heavy rain from TL
 2. TL developing in top end generally affects the entire area
 3. Congestion and backlogs can result at air strips
13. Frequency of weather reporting: Tropical Low (12 hrly) Vs Tropical Cyclone (4hrly).
14. Personnel can be intolerant of temporary inconvenience at holding point

Recommendations

- 1. The industry as a whole needs to acknowledge that this is an issue that needs addressing through a coordinated approach with all stake holders particularly in this area**
- 2. Early up front planning is required to address limitations, and problem areas. All the stake holders (including vessel/helicopter/emergency service providers need to be involved.**
- 3. We are coming into Cyclone season once again. Now is the time for you to review your companies procedures, evacuation processes, and implement the learnings from this event**

Cyclone Predictability





Thank you